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Proponents of the financial theory of the firm generally argue that other constituencies 
should either protect themselves (workers can bargain for safer working conditions, for example) 
or seek regulatory protection by means of occupational safety and health laws. On the financial 
theory of the firm, the responsibility for upholding ethical standards, forcing the internalization of 
costs, and so on, belong ultimately to government, not to corporate managers. The main argument 
for this position is that corporate managers have neither the right nor the ability to pursue 
multiple, nonfinancial goals.By contrast, stakeholder theory contends that the list of corporate 
constituencies includes all those who have a legitimate interest in the activities of a firm, regardless 
of any interest that the firm takes in them. Furthermore, the interests of these stakeholder groups 
merit consideration for their own sake, not because of their usefulness to the firm. Stakeholder 
theory has not been developed as a full-fledged alternative to the financial theory, and it is 
questionable whether it is necessarily incompatible with it. SWM is justified on the financial theory 
for its benefits to the whole of society, which includes all stakeholder groups. Corporate managers 
need not consider the interests of all stakeholders as long as these interests are adequately 
protected by some means, such as government regulation. In addition, managing a corporation 
with attention to stakeholder interests may be an effective means for maximizing shareholder 
value. Some very successful companies are driven by philosophies that put employees or customers 
first. 
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Although many business ethics problems are common to every functional area, 
finance involves some distinctive ethical issues that require separate treatment. Because 
financial activity is closely regulated, these issues are often addressed as matters of law rather 
than ethics, but the basis of regulation in finance includes some fundamental ethical 
precepts, such as fairness in financial markets and the duties of fiduciaries. The law is an 
uncertain regulator, though, and much financial activity presupposes unwritten rules of 
ethical behavior. People trained in finance enter many different lines of work, and so finance 
ethics is necessarily diverse; ethical conduct is not the same for bond traders, mutual fund 
managers, and corporate financial officers, for example. Moreover, finance ethics is 
concerned not only with individual conduct but also with the operation of financial markets 
and financial institutions. Finally, the financial management of corporations, with its objective 
of maximizing shareholder wealth, raises yet different ethical issues. Despite this 
complexity, the field of financial ethics can be organized under the three major headings of 
financial markets, financial services, and financial management. 
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• Financial markets are vulnerable to unfair trading practices (fraud and 
manipulation), unfair conditions (an unlevel playing field), and contractual difficulties 
(forming, interpreting, and enforcing contracts). The main aim of federal securities 
laws and the self-regulation of exchanges is expressed in the phrase "fair and orderly" 
markets, which reflects the need in financial markets to balance the twin goals of fairness 
and efficiency. 
• Many individuals and institutions serve as financial intermediaries, providing 
financial services on behalf of others. Financial intermediaries commonly make decisions as 
agents for principals in an agency relation, and they often become fiduciaries with 
fiduciary duties. Agents and fiduciaries have an obligation to act solely in the interests of 
other parties and, especially, to avoid conflicts of interest. Although financial services 
providers are often merely sellers in a buyer-seller relation, they still have the obligations of 
any seller to avoid deceptive and abusive sales practices. 
• Financial Management: Business firms are legally structured as the financial 
instruments of shareholders, and officers and directors are agents of firms, and have a 
fiduciary duty to manage the firms with the objective of maximizing shareholder wealth. 
Ethical issues in financial management concern the actions that violate the duties of 
financial managers and the discretion of financial managers to serve the interests of 
nonshareholder groups, commonly called "stakeholders." 
All financial activity takes place in a larger economic, political, and social setting, 
and so ethical issues arise about the overall impact of financial activity. Although financial 
decision making is generally limited to the financial factors of risk and return over time, 
ethics includes a consideration of the ethical treatment of everyone affected by a decision, 
and the consequences for the whole of society. 
 
1. FINANCIAL MARKETS 
 
The fundamental ethical requirement of financial markets is that they be fair. 
Fairness may be defined either substantively (when the price of a security reflects the actual 
value) or procedurally (when buyers are enabled to determine the actual value of a security). 
In the USA, some state securities laws aim at substantive fairness by requiring expert 
evaluation of new securities (so-called "blue-sky" laws), but the federal Securities Act of 
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 attempt to secure fairness procedurally by 
requiring adequate disclosure. The rationale for mandatory disclosure is that securities 
transactions are more likely to be fair when material information must be disclosed, and 
investors have easy access to information. 
 
 
1.1. UNFAIR TRADING PRACTICES 
 
Fraud, manipulation, and other unfair trading practices lead not only to unfair 
treatment in securities transactions but to a loss of investor confidence in the integrity of 
financial markets. Speculative activity also produces excess volatility, which was blamed for 
the stock market crashes of 1929 and October 1987. 
Both fraud and manipulation are defined broadly. Section 17(a) of the 1933 
Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act prohibit anyone 
involved in the issue or exchange of securities to make a false statement of a material fact, 
to omit a fact that makes a statement of material facts misleading, or to engage in any 
practice or scheme that would serve to defraud. Whereas fraud generally involves the 
disclosure or concealment of information that bears on the value of a security, 
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manipulation consists of trading for the purpose of creating a misleading impression about 
a security's value. 
Fraud is obviously committed by an initial stock offering that inflates the assets of a 
firm or fails to disclose some of its liabilities. Insider trading has been prosecuted as a fraud 
on the grounds that nonpublic material information ought to be disclosed before trading. In 
the 1920s, the stock market was manipulated by traders who bid up the price of stock in 
order to sell at the peak to unwary investors. In recent years, concern has been expressed 
about a form of program trading known as index arbitrage, in which traders are able to 
create volatility in different markets, solely for the purpose of trading on the resulting price 
differences. 
 
1.2. FAIR CONDITIONS 
 
Fairness in financial markets is often expressed by the concept of a level playing 
field. A playing field may be unlevel because of inequalities in information, bargaining power, 
resources, processing ability, and special vulnerabilities. 
Unequal information, or information asymmetry, may refer either to the fact that 
the parties to a transaction do not possess the same information or that they do not have the 
same access to information. The possession of different information is a pervasive feature of 
markets that is not always ethically objectionable. Indeed, investors who invest resources 
in acquiring superior information are entitled to exploit this advantage, and they perform a 
service by making markets more efficient. The unequal possession of information is unfair 
only when the information has not been legitimately acquired or when its use violates 
some right or obligation. Other arguments against insider trading, for example, are that the 
information has not been acquired legitimately but has been misappropriated from the 
rightful owner (the "misappropriation theory") and that an insider who trades on 
information that has been acquired in a fiduciary relation violates a fiduciary duty. Equal 
access to information is problematical because accessibility is not a feature of information 
itself but a function of the investment that is required to obtain information. To the objection 
that an inside trader is using information that is inherently inaccessible, some reply that 
anyone can become an insider by devoting enough resources. 
Similarly, inequalities in bargaining power, resources, and processing ability - which 
are pervasive in financial markets - are ethically objectionable only when they are used in 
violation of some right or obligation and especially when they are used coer-cively. The 
main ethical requirement is that people not use any advantage unfairly. For example, 
American stock markets permit relatively unsophisticated investors with modest resources 
and processing ability to buy stocks on fair terms, and some changes, such as increased use 
of program trading or private placements, are criticized for increasing the advantages of 
institutional investors. (The growth of mutual funds has served to reduce the adverse 
consequences of inequalities among investors.) Vulnerabilities, such as impulsiveness or 
overconfidence, create opportunities for exploitation that can be countered by such 
measures as a "cooling off" period on purchases and loans, and the warning to request and 
read a prospectus before investing. 
 
 
1.3. FINANCIAL CONTRACTING 
 
Some financial instruments, such as home mortgages and futures options, are 
contracts which commit the parties to a certain course of action, and many financial 
relations, such as being a trustee or corporate officer, are contractual in nature. Contracts 
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are often vague, ambiguous, or incomplete, with the result that disagreements arise about 
what is ethically and legally required. 
First, beyond the written words of express contracts lie innumerable tacit 
understandings that constitute implied contracts. Financial affairs would be impossible if every 
detail had to be made explicit. However, whatever is left implicit is subject to differing 
interpretations, and insofar as implied contracts are not legally enforceable, they may 
be breached with impunity. Not only financial instruments but the relations of 
corporations with employees, customers, suppliers, and other stakeholders consist of 
implied contracts, from which each party receives some value. One objection to hostile 
takeovers is that raiders are able to finance such deals by capturing the value of the 
implied contracts that the target firm has made with its stakeholders. 
Second, contracts are sometimes imperfect because of limitations in our cognitive 
ability, especially incomplete knowledge, bounded rationality, and future contingencies. 
In addition, some situations may be too complex and uncertain to permit careful 
planning. As a result, the parties may fail to negotiate contracts that produce the 
maximum benefit for themselves. Disputes in contractual relations also arise over what 
constitutes a breach of contract and what is an appropriate remedy. 
Agency and fiduciary relations are one solution for the problems of imperfect 
contracting because they replace specific obligations with a general duty to act in 
another's interests. In particular, the fiduciary relations of managers to shareholders has 
arisen because of the difficulties of writing contracts for this particular relation. Similarly, 
supplier relations are not easily reduced to contractual terms. The term relational 
contracting has been coined to describe the building of working relations as an alternative to 
rigid contracts. 
 
2. FINANCIAL SERVICES 
 
The financial services industry - which includes commercial banks, securities and 
investment firms, mutual and pension funds, insurance companies, and financial 
planners - provides a vast array of financial services to individuals, businesses, and 
governments. Financial services firms act primarily as financial intermediaries, which is to say 
that they use their capital to provide services rather than to trade on their own behalf. In 
providing financial services, these firms sometimes act as agents or fiduciaries with respect to 
clients; at other times, they act as sellers in a typical buyer-seller relation. Thus, a broker who 
is authorized to trade for a client's account is an agent, but a broker who makes a cold call to 
a prospect is merely a salesperson. Many ethical disputes result from misunderstandings 
about the nature of a financial service provider's role. 
 
2.1.FIDUCIARIES AND AGENTS 
 
A fiduciary is a person who is entrusted to act in the interests of another. Fiduciary 
duties are the duties of a fiduciary to act in that other person's interest without gaining any 
material benefit except with the knowledge and consent of that person. Similar to the 
fiduciary relation is the relation of agent and principal, in which one person (the agent) is 
engaged to act on behalf of another (the principal). Whereas fiduciary relations arise when 
something of value is entrusted to another person, agency relations are due to the need to 
rely on others for their specialized knowledge and skill. In both relations, the specific acts 
to be performed are not fully specified in advance and fiduciaries and agents have wide 
latitude. 
A major source of unethical conduct by fiduciaries and agents is conflict of interest, 
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in which a personal interest of the fiduciary or agent interferes with the ability of the 
person to act in the interest of the other person. Fiduciaries and agents are called upon to 
exercise judgment on behalf of others, and their judgment can be compromised if they 
stand to gain personally by a decision. For example, a conflict of interest is created when a 
brokerage firm offers a higher commission for selling in-house mutual funds. The conflict 
arises because the broker has an incentive to sell funds that may not be in a client's best 
interests. Whether mutual fund managers should be permitted to trade for their own 
account is a controversial question because of the perceived conflict of interest. Fiduciaries 
and agents also have duties to preserve the confidentiality of information and not to use 
the information for their own benefit. Thus, "piggyback" trading, in which a broker copies 
the trades of a savvy client, is a breach of confidentiality. 
Agency relations are subject to some well-known difficulties that arise from the 
inability of principals to monitor agents closely. These difficulties are opportunism, moral 
hazard, and adverse selection. Opportunism, or shirking, occurs because of the tendency of 
agents to advance their own interests despite the commitment to act on behalf of another. 
In agency theory, which is the study of agency relations, whatever a principal loses from 
opportunism is known as agency loss. The total of the agency loss and expenditures to 
reduce it are called agency costs. Moral hazard arises when the cost (or risk) of an activity 
is borne by others, as when a person seeks more medical care because of insurance. Moral 
hazard can be reduced in insurance by requiring deductibles and copayments, which 
provide an insured person with an incentive to lower costs. Insurance companies can also 
seek out better insurance prospects, but this leads to the problem of adverse selection. 
Adverse selection is the tendency, in insurance, of less suitable prospects to seek more 
insurance, which increases the risk for insurers who cannot easily identify good and bad 
insurance prospects. More generally, principals are not always able to judge the suitability 
of agents, and agents have an incentive to misrepresent themselves. 
Many ethical problems, ranging from churning of client accounts by stockbrokers 
to the empire-building tendencies of CEOs, result from the difficulties inherent in agency 
relations. These problems can be addressed by closer monitoring and by changes in the 
structure of the relation. For example, the incentive for brokers to churn could be reduced 
by basing compensation more on the performance of clients' portfolios and less on the 
volume of trades. In addition, compensating executives with stock options aligns their 
interests more closely with those of the shareholders and thus prevents empire building. 
The most effective solutions for ethical problems in agency relations are twofold: first, 
there must be a strong sense of professionalism accompanied by professional organizations 
with codes of ethics; second, a high degree of trust must be present. Trust is essential in the 
financial services industry, and companies generally pay a heavy price for violating the 
public's confidence. 
 
2.2. SALES PRACTICES 
 
In the selling of financial products, such as mutual funds, insurance policies, and 
loans, the ordinary standards for ethical sales practices apply. Thus, the financial services 
industry, like any business, has an obligation to refrain from deception and to make 
adequate disclosure of material information. A mutual fund prospectus, for example, is 
screened by regulatory authorities, but personal sales pitches and mass-media advertising 
sometimes contain false and misleading claims. For example, figures in an advertisement 
may exaggerate the fund's past performance or omit sales charges. Whether an 
advertisement is deceptive is often a matter of dispute. The generally accepted standard for 
disclosure is materiality, which refers to information about which an average prudent 
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investor ought to be informed or to which a reasonable person would attach importance 
in making a decision. 
For many financial products, the degree of risk is material information that ought 
to be disclosed. Thus, some clients of investment firms have attributed large losses in 
derivatives to inadequate disclosure of the risks involved. Brokers and insurance agents have 
an obligation to recommend only products that are suitable. Risk and suitability are closely 
related because whether an investment is suitable generally depends on the level of risk that 
is appropriate for an investor. Suitability is often difficult to determine, and investments may 
be unsuitable for many different reasons. Thus, a security might be unsuitable because it 
does not offer sufficient diversification or it is not sufficiently liquid, or because it involves 
inappropriate trading techniques, such as the use of margin. 
Financial products are susceptible to abusive sales practices, such as "twisting," in 
which an insurance agent persuades a client to replace an existing policy merely for 
the commission, and "flipping," which is the practice of replacing one loan with another in 
order to generate additional fees. The poor are frequent targets of abuses by loan 
providers who offer high-interest loans and add on various "options" of little value. 
Finally, financial products should meet certain standards of integrity, just as automobiles 
and houses can be shoddily made, so too are there shoddy financial products. The sale of 
limited partnerships, for example, has been criticized in recent years for dubious valuation 
of assets and questionable practices by developers. 
Victims of fraud or abuse by financial services firms generally have recourse to 
the courts, but the securities industry in the USA requires most customers (and 
employees) to sign a predispute arbitration agreement (PDAA) that commits them to 
binding arbitration of disputes. Mandatory arbitration is spreading to the holders of credit 
cards, insurance policies, and other financial products. Although arbitration has many 
advantages over litigation, critics charge that the process is often unfair and denies 
investors adequate protection. The controversy over compulsory arbitration in the 
securities industry focuses on three issues: the requirement that investors sign a PDAA as 
a condition of opening an account, the alleged industry bias of arbitration panels, and the 
permissibility of punitive damages. In addition, the requirement that employees submit 
complaints about such matters as discrimination and harassment to arbitration denies 
them of the right to sue in court, a right that employees outside the securities industry 
take for granted. 
 
2.3. FINANCIAL SERVICES FIRMS 
 
Financial services firms are themselves businesses, and the management of such a 
business raises some ethical issues, especially in the treatment of institutional clients. For 
example, underwriters of municipal bonds have been criticized for making political 
contributions in city elections in order to gain access. Firms as well as individuals 
encounter conflicts of interest, such as the reluctance of brokerage firms to issue a 
negative analysis of a client company's stock. In recent years, rogue traders have caused 
great losses at some firms, including the collapse of a major bank. 
The managers of large investment portfolios for mutual funds, insurance 
companies, pension funds, and private endowments face two important ethical questions. 
1 Should they consider social factors in making decisions, such as how a 
corporation treats its employees or its record on the environment? 
2 Should they vote the stock that they hold, and if so, what criteria should they 
use to evaluate the issues that are submitted to a vote? 
Some large institutional investors take a hands-off approach, while others are 
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becoming actively involved as shareholders in a movement known as relationship 
investing. 
 
3. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
 
Financial managers have the task of actively deploying assets rather than 
investing them. Unlike a portfolio manager who merely buys stocks of corporations for a 
client, a corporate financial manager is involved in the running of a corporation. 
Investment decisions in a corporation are concerned not with which securities to hold but 
with what business opportunities to pursue. These decisions are still made using standard 
financial criteria, however. Finance theory can be applied to the operation of a corporation 
by viewing the various components of a business as a portfolio with assets that can be 
bought and sold. Option pricing theory, in particular, suggests that all of the possibilities 
for a firm can be regarded options to buy and sell assets. Bankruptcy, for example, is 
exercising an option to "sell" the corporation to the debtholders. (However, one critic has 
called this a "thoroughly immoral view of finance.") The ethical issues in financial 
management are twofold. 
• Financial managers, as agents and fiduciaries, have an obligation to manage 
assets prudently and especially to avoid the use of assets for personal benefit. Thus, 
managers, who have preferential access to information, should not engage in insider 
trading or self-dealing. For example, management buyouts, in which a group of 
managers take a public corporation private, raise the question whether people who are paid 
to mind the store should seek to buy it. 
• Financial managers are called upon to make decisions that impact many 
different groups, and they have an obligation in their decision making to balance some 
competing interests. For example, should the decision to close a plant be made solely 
with the shareholders' interests in mind or should the interests of the employees and the 
local community be taken into account? 
 
3.1.BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS 
 
In finance theory, the objective of the firm is shareholder wealth maximization 
(SWM). This objective is reflected in corporate law, according to which officers and 
directors of corporations are agents of the corporation and have a fiduciary duty to 
operate the corporation in the interests of the shareholders. Despite the seemingly 
unequivocal guide of SWM, financial managers still face the need, in some situations, to 
balance competing interests. In particular, decisions about levels of risk and hostile 
takeovers reveal some difficulties in the pursuit of SWM. 
The level of risk Maximizing shareholder wealth cannot be done without assuming 
some risk. A critical, often overlooked, task of financial management is determining the 
appropriate level of risk. Leveraging, for example, increases the riskiness of a firm. The 
capital asset pricing model suggests that, for properly diversified shareholders, the level of 
risk for any given firm, called unique risk, is irrelevant and that only market or systemic risk 
is important. Finance theory treats bankruptcy as merely an event risk that is worth 
courting if the returns are high enough. If a firm is in distress, then a high risk, "bet-the-
farm" strategy is especially beneficial to shareholders, because they will reap all the gains 
of success, while everyone will share the losses of failure (the moral hazard problem). 
Consequently, a financial manager should seek the highest return adjusted for risk, no 
matter the actual consequences. 
However, a high-risk strategy poses dangers for bondholders, employees, suppliers, 
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and managers themselves, all of whom place a high value on the continued operation of the 
firm. Employees, in particular, are more vulnerable than shareholders to unique, as opposed 
to systemic, risk because of their inability to diversify. Is it ethical for financial managers to 
increase risk in a firm so as to benefit shareholders, at the expense of other corporate 
constituencies? Does the firm, as an ongoing entity, have value that should be considered 
in financial decision making? Some have argued that managing purely by financial criteria, 
without regard for the level of risk, is immoral. 
Hostile takeovers Hostile takeovers are often epic battles with winners and losers. For 
this reason, the rules for acquiring controlling interest should be fair to all parties 
involved. Managers of target companies feel entitled to a fair chance to defend their jobs; 
shareholders who sell their shares, and those who do not, have a right to make a decision in 
a fair and orderly manner; bondholders often lose in takeovers because of the increased 
debt; and employees and residents of local communities, who usually have no say in the 
decision, are generally the groups most harmed. 
Insofar as a takeover is conducted in a market through the buying and selling of 
shares, there exists a "market for corporate control." Critics of hostile takeovers question 
whether such an important decision should be made in the marketplace. Does a market 
for corporate control provide adequate protection for all of the parties whose interests are 
affected? Incumbent managers have many defenses. Collectively called "shark repellents," 
these include poison pills, white knights, lockups, crown jewel options, the Pac-Man 
defense, golden parachutes, and greenmail. These are frequently criticized for being self-
serving and for giving management an undue advantage in thwarting shareholder desires 
for change. 
The directors of a target company, whose approval is often necessary for a 
successful takeover, have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the firm itself, 
which may not be identical with the interests of either the preexisting shareholders or 
those who seek control. A majority of states have adopted so-called "other constituency 
statutes" that permit boards of directors to consider other constituencies, such as em-
ployees, suppliers, customers, and local communities, in evaluating a takeover bid. Many 
other laws govern the conduct of raiders and defenders alike, so that the market for 
corporate control is scarcely a pure market. In general, courts and legislatures have 
created rules for takeovers that seek both fairness and efficiency. 
 
3.2. THE FINANCIAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 
 
The financial argument for SWM, and the legal argument for the fiduciary duties 
of corporate officers and directors, are each built upon a conception of the business firm as 
a nexus of contracts between a firm and its constituencies, including shareholders, 
debtholders, employees, suppliers, and customers. This nexus-of-contracts view of the firm 
is employed in law and finance as a descriptive model for explaining the legal and financial 
structure of firms as well as a normative model for justifying fiduciary duties and SWM. 
The normative adequacy of the nexus-of-contracts view has been challenged, especially by 
those who contend that corporations have ethical obligations to various nonshareholder 
constituencies which are not accounted for in the model. Stakeholder theory is offered by 
some as a more adequate descriptive and normative model of the modern corporation. 
Fiduciary duties in corporate law were originally founded on the role of shareholders 
as the owners of the corporation who had entrusted their assets to management. With the 
separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation, shareholders ceased to be 
owners in any meaningful sense, and the fiduciary duties of corporate managers to 
shareholders are now based on the premise that serving the shareholders' interests 
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maximizes total wealth creation. The aim of corporate governance structures is to restrain 
managers, who have de facto control, from using corporate assets for their own benefit 
and to give them incentives to apply these assets to their most productive uses. In terms of 
agency theory, this end can be achieved at the lowest agency cost by imposing a fiduciary 
duty on managers to maximize shareholder wealth. 
In finance theory, shareholders are residual risk bearers, which is to say that they 
are entitled only to the earnings that remain (the residue) after all other obligations (such 
as wages to employees and payments to suppliers) are met. The argument, then, is that 
people with capital would agree to become residual risk bearers only if a firm is operated in 
their interests. Without this protection, investors would seek other contractual 
arrangements, such as the guaranteed returns of a bondholder. In the nexus-of-contracts 
firm, bondholders' returns, employees' wages, and suppliers' payments are assured by 
fixed-term contracts, but the interests of shareholders can be protected only if management 
agrees to serve their interests. Furthermore, residual risk bearers have the greatest 
incentives to ensure that the firm is operated so as to create the maximum amount of 
wealth. The primacy of shareholder interests thus benefits society as a whole. 
 
 
3.3.STOCKHOLDERS VS STAKEHOLDERS 
 
 
The shareholder-centered financial theory of the firm is criticized for giving 
inadequate recognition to the rights and interests of nonshareholder constituencies. Critics 
make four related points concerning ethical standards, externalities, abuses in 
contracting, and distribution. 
Ethical standards Corporations ought to treat all corporate constituencies or 
stakeholder groups according to certain minimal ethical standards. Agents and fiduciaries 
do not have a right to advance the interests that they are pledged to serve in ways that 
violate fundamental rights or inflict wrongful harm. Thus, to expose workers and 
consumers to hazardous substances, or to exploit labor in lesser-developed countries, is 
unjustified. 
Externalities Business activity imposes great social costs in the form of externalities or 
spillover effects. When pollution or urban blight, for example, is a direct result of corporate 
investment decisions, then critics contend that they have an obligation to address these 
problems. 
Abuses in contracting Contracting provides an opportunity for one party to take 
unfair advantage of the other party. Such advantage-taking occurs in many forms. For 
example, downsizing may involve breaking an implicit understanding of job security for 
loyal employees. Some solvent corporations have sought bankruptcy protection so as to 
avoid paying product liability claims to injured consumers or to renege on collective 
bargaining agreements. In agency theory, principals are assumed to be vulnerable to 
shirking by agents, but agents can abuse principals by predatory behavior that has been 
called "sharking." 
Distribution The financial theory of the firm takes no account of the inequalities 
that result from contracting in the nexus-of-contracts firm. In the USA, the widening gulf 
between low- and high-wage employees, and the high levels of executive compensation are 
causes for concern. In general, markets achieve efficiency, not equity; hence the need to 
attend to the equity/efficiency trade-off. 
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3.4. STAKEHOLDER THEORY 
 
 
These four sources of ethical problems are acknowledged in the finance literature, 
and disagreements occur primarily over their solution. Proponents of the financial theory 
of the firm generally argue that other constituencies should either protect themselves 
(workers can bargain for safer working conditions, for example) or seek regulatory 
protection by means of occupational safety and health laws. On the financial theory of the 
firm, the responsibility for upholding ethical standards, forcing the internalization of costs, 
and so on, belong ultimately to government, not to corporate managers. The main 
argument for this position is that corporate managers have neither the right nor the ability 
to pursue multiple, nonfinancial goals. 
By contrast, stakeholder theory contends that the list of corporate constituencies 
includes all those who have a legitimate interest in the activities of a firm, regardless of any 
interest that the firm takes in them. Furthermore, the interests of these stakeholder groups 
merit consideration for their own sake, not because of their usefulness to the firm. 
Stakeholder theory has not been developed as a full-fledged alternative to the financial 
theory, and it is questionable whether it is necessarily incompatible with it. SWM is 
justified on the financial theory for its benefits to the whole of society, which includes all 
stakeholder groups. Corporate managers need not consider the interests of all stakeholders 
as long as these interests are adequately protected by some means, such as government 
regulation. In addition, managing a corporation with attention to stakeholder interests may 
be an effective means for maximizing shareholder value. Some very successful companies 
are driven by philosophies that put employees or customers first. 
Finally, the concept of shareholder wealth is problematical. The existence of dif-
ferent kinds of securities blurs the distinction between equity and debt, and creates 
multiple classes of shareholders with divergent interests. Even holders of ordinary common 
stock may differ in their risk preferences or time horizons. Some finance research indicates 
that managing to maximize short-term stock price may not result in maximum shareholder 
value in the long run. Thus, SWM is not a wholly objective guide for financial managers, 
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POSLOVNA ETIKA U FINANCIJSKOM SEKTORU 
 
Sažetak 
Predlagatelji financijske teorije poduzeća uglavnom su stava da se drugi sudionici trebaju sami 
zaštititi (na primjer, radnici se mogu izboriti za sigurnije uvjete rada) ili zatražiti regulatornu zaštitu 
putem zakona o radu, sigurnosti i zaštiti zdravlja. Po financijskoj teoriji poduzeća, odgovornost za 
održavanje etičkih standarda, provođenje internalizacije troškova i slično, u konačnici snosi vlada, a ne 
korporativni menadžeri. Glavni argument za takav stav je da korporativni menadžeri nemaju ni pravo 
ni sposobnost postavljati si višestruke nefinancijske ciljeve. Suprotno tome, teorija dionika tvrdi da su 
sudionici korporacije i svi oni koji imaju zakoniti interes u aktivnosti tvrtke, neovisno o eventualnom 
interesu kojeg tvrtka ima prema njima. Nadalje, interesi tih grupa dionika trebaju biti uzeti u obzir 
zbog njih samih a ne radi njihove koristi za tvrtku. Teorija dionika nije razvijena kao punopravna 
alternativa financijskoj teoriji, te je upitno je li nužno s njom nekompatibilna. SWM je opravdan u 
financijskoj teoriji radi dobrobiti koju donosi cjelokupnom društvu, što uključuje sve grupe dionika. 
Korporativni menadžeri ne moraju uzimati u obzir interese svih dionika sve dok su ti interesi na neki 
način adekvatno zaštićeni, kao na primjer vladinim regulativama. Osim toga, upravljanje korporacijom 
na način da se posvećuje pažnja interesima dionika može biti efikasan način maksimiziranja 
vrijednosti dioničara. Neke vrlo uspješne tvrtke imaju filozofiju koja zaposlenike i klijente stavlja na 
prvo mjesto. 
 
Ključne riječi: etika, posao, financijska teorija, menadžer, tržište, etički kodeks, dostojanstvo osobe 
